đź“… Original date posted:2014-01-15
đź“ť Original message:On Wed, 15 Jan 2014 23:51:21 +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:
> The goal of all that is that we get to keep our existing IPv4 based
> anti-sybil heuristics, so we can’t possibly make anything worse,
> only better. Plus, we’ve now set things up so in future if/when we
> come up with a better anti-sybil system based on anonymous identities
> or other fancy crypto, we can take out the “connect via clearnet”
> step and go straight to using hidden services with only a very small
> set of code changes and no new protocol work.
I think it might be ok to use proof-of-stake on as an anti-sybil scheme
on tor.. people would obviously not want to associate their wallet with
their IP address, but is there any harm in associating it with a
(temporary) tor service id (especially one that isn't used for anything
other than relaying bitcoin transactions)? If each node you connect too
can sign some challenge with a key that controls some BTC (and your
client node verifies that the funds are different) then that might be
useful.. even if it were only a small 0.01BTC stake that would be
similar to the cost of obtaining another IP through a cheap VPS or VPN
and significantly higher than the cost to an attacker who is able to
MITM everything and operate on any IP anyway.
Rob
Robert McKay [ARCHIVE] /
npub1t6…he2py
2023-06-07 17:12:10
in reply to nevent1q…4s90
Author Public Key
npub1t6suh64e65qzzjtthffl6sa3cagp6k9usnx4qev4jsjzf7xud8psdhe2pyPublished at
2023-06-07 17:12:10Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-01-15\n📝 Original message:On Wed, 15 Jan 2014 23:51:21 +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:\n\u003e The goal of all that is that we get to keep our existing IPv4 based\n\u003e anti-sybil heuristics, so we can’t possibly make anything worse,\n\u003e only better. Plus, we’ve now set things up so in future if/when we\n\u003e come up with a better anti-sybil system based on anonymous identities\n\u003e or other fancy crypto, we can take out the “connect via clearnet”\n\u003e step and go straight to using hidden services with only a very small\n\u003e set of code changes and no new protocol work.\n\nI think it might be ok to use proof-of-stake on as an anti-sybil scheme \non tor.. people would obviously not want to associate their wallet with \ntheir IP address, but is there any harm in associating it with a \n(temporary) tor service id (especially one that isn't used for anything \nother than relaying bitcoin transactions)? If each node you connect too \ncan sign some challenge with a key that controls some BTC (and your \nclient node verifies that the funds are different) then that might be \nuseful.. even if it were only a small 0.01BTC stake that would be \nsimilar to the cost of obtaining another IP through a cheap VPS or VPN \nand significantly higher than the cost to an attacker who is able to \nMITM everything and operate on any IP anyway.\n\nRob",
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