Why Nostr? What is Njump?
2023-06-08 01:06:04
in reply to

Jorge Timón [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-03-17 📝 Original message:On Sat, Mar 12, 2022 at ...

📅 Original date posted:2022-03-17
📝 Original message:On Sat, Mar 12, 2022 at 7:34 PM Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > If I find out I'm in the economic minority then I have little choice but to either accept the existence of the new rules or sell my Bitcoin
>
> I do worry about what I have called a "dumb majority soft fork". This is where, say, mainstream adoption has happened, some crisis of some magnitude happens that convinces a lot of people something needs to change now. Let's say it's another congestion period where fees spike for months. Getting into and out of lighting is hard and maybe even the security of lightning's security model is called into question because it would either take too long to get a transaction on chain or be too expensive. Panicy people might once again think something like "let's increase the block size to 1GB, then we'll never have this problem again". This could happen in a segwit-like soft fork.

I guess this is a better explained example for a hypothetical "evil
fork" that may sound more concrete and plausible to some people than
my own, which isn't that different. Thanks.

> In a future where Bitcoin is the dominant world currency, it might not be unrealistic to imagine that an economic majority might not understand why such a thing would be so dangerous, or think the risk is low enough to be worth it. At that point, we in the economic minority would need a plan to hard fork away. One wouldn't necessarily need to sell all their majority fork Bitcoin, but they could.
>
> That minority fork would of course need some mining power. How much? I don't know, but we should think about how small of a minority chain we could imagine might be worth saving. Is 5% enough? 1%? How long would the chain stall if hash power dropped to 1%?

In perfect competition the mining power costs per chain tends to equal
the rewards offered by that chain, both in subsidy and transaction
fees.
For example, if chain A gets a reward 10 times as valuable as chain
B's reward, then one should expect it to get 10 times more hashrate
too.
Of course, perfect competition is just a theoretical concept though.
Author Public Key
npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8