📅 Original date posted:2012-02-28
📝 Original message:On Tuesday, February 28, 2012 11:48:39 AM Pieter Wuille wrote:
> A simple way to fix this, is adding an extra protocol rule[1]:
>
> Do not allow blocks to contain a transaction whose hash is equal to
> that of a former transaction which has not yet been completely spent.
>
> I've written about it in BIP30[2]. There is a patch for the reference
> client, which has been tested and verified to make the attack
> impossible.
Has it been verified to make even rocconor's complicated transaction-based
version impossible?
> The purpose of this mail is asking for support for adding this rule to
> the protocol rules. If there is consensus this rule is the solution, I
> hope pools and miners can agree to update their nodes without lengthy
> coinbase-flagging procedure that would only delay a solution. So, who
> is in favor?
Can we do this in two steps? First, prefer blocks which don't break the rule;
once 55%+ are confirmed to have upgraded, then it is safe to treat it as a
hard rule.
Luke-Jr [ARCHIVE] /
npub1dt…u7wrs
2023-06-07 05:09:39
in reply to nevent1q…rf6x
Author Public Key
npub1dtr22xd42nv07un2xq0rmtkqkjylgsmexau0anxxafa9xmmn2ncshu7wrsPublished at
2023-06-07 05:09:39Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2012-02-28\n📝 Original message:On Tuesday, February 28, 2012 11:48:39 AM Pieter Wuille wrote:\n\u003e A simple way to fix this, is adding an extra protocol rule[1]:\n\u003e \n\u003e Do not allow blocks to contain a transaction whose hash is equal to\n\u003e that of a former transaction which has not yet been completely spent.\n\u003e \n\u003e I've written about it in BIP30[2]. There is a patch for the reference\n\u003e client, which has been tested and verified to make the attack\n\u003e impossible.\n\nHas it been verified to make even rocconor's complicated transaction-based \nversion impossible?\n\n\u003e The purpose of this mail is asking for support for adding this rule to\n\u003e the protocol rules. If there is consensus this rule is the solution, I\n\u003e hope pools and miners can agree to update their nodes without lengthy\n\u003e coinbase-flagging procedure that would only delay a solution. So, who\n\u003e is in favor?\n\nCan we do this in two steps? First, prefer blocks which don't break the rule; \nonce 55%+ are confirmed to have upgraded, then it is safe to treat it as a \nhard rule.",
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