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2026-08-06 16:45:56 GMT
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codonaft on Nostr: My proposition is to make a softer option for the duress pin (possibly with some kind ...

My proposition is to make a softer option for the duress pin (possibly with some kind of warning in the corresponding settings menu that using it as a bypass for border checks will cause troubles). Could be called a "robber pin".

For instance, it could clear data of specific applications, remove specific files, etc., maybe remove a specific eSIM, and leave no visual traces that this option was ever configured. And keep working as normally, without making it look too suspicious.

This should be useful in case it's clear that the attacker has no access to the analysis tools, which could prove what exactly was removed.

GOS devs responses appear to be solely limited to those who are at risk of being checked with these tools. I think this doesn't make sense: you don't need any tools to know that the phone was just fully wiped, 'cause it kinda screams in the face with this fact currently:

https://www.androidauthority.com/grapheneos-duress-pin-us-prosecution-3691271/

I don't say that they've implemented something useless, though. It's useful for journalists in particular, who may be transporting some raw secret materials, just as one example.

> quiet a rare case

The meme I posted is an expression of my frustration with GOS devs ignorance of dozens of repetitive criticisms made by others, long before me.

GOS doesn't seem to respond to this particular kind of criticism on Nostr. They, however, at least used to respond on the platforms, where they in practice may threaten a critic with a ban (last paragraph):

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/17241-duress-pin-limited-usefulness/18

The thing I learned from all this, with the help of in a completely unrelated discussion, is that this kind of criticism should never ever be mixed with the "social normality" kind of argumentation (including UX-related).

#grapheneos