📅 Original date posted:2017-05-04
📝 Original message:The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools, by
outsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW. By doing so
they could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and proof-of-goodwill for a
small fee.
We would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template
block which:
* Does not contain a valid header yet
* Contains the transaction selection
* Contains a coinbase output with a predetermined part of the block
reward (say 0.5%) to themselves* Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC resistant
hash function behind a OP_RETURN.
The template with the highest PoW since the last block would be leading.
A miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of their own, adding
the rest of the reward and the SHA nonce themselves. That way they would
set up a competition among full nodes.
This would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a pool's
interest to do this via naming and shaming.
Tomas
bitcrust
On Wed, May 3, 2017, at 23:43, Ben Thompson via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of users
> would likely download the blockchain from a node that was not
> enforcing a tip requirement as it would seem like unnecessary cost as
> in protocols such as BitTorrent there is no such tips in sharing files
> and the blockchain distribution is in eccense the same thing. However
> perhaps I am underestimating the generosity of node operators but I
> feel that adding a cost to the blockchain (assuming that all users add
> a tip requirement) would lead to centralisation.>
> On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, <bitcoin-
> dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:>> IDEA:
>> - Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address. Users that need to
>> download the block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a
>> tip to the peers that served them (by % served). Recommended tip
>> of 10mbit should be fine.>>
>> - A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain. If
>> they do, users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.>>
>> CONS:
>>
>> For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their own
>> full node. After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a copy of
>> the blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive prospect of
>> hosting a full node.>> PROS:
>>
>> As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money back
>> and more. This is the an incentive for quality, long term hosting.>> In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around
>> longer. It also discourages "installation spam" attacks on the
>> network.>> Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is
>> successful.>>
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Tomas [ARCHIVE] /
npub1rs…9evk4
2023-06-07 20:00:44
in reply to nevent1q…9jhf
Author Public Key
npub1rsp4w56r24w3zv4xy8zfgesep45qmf9rq6aghxfw3wr7yemqnnwsf9evk4Published at
2023-06-07 20:00:44Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-05-04\n📝 Original message:The ones that *could* pay non-mining full nodes are miners/pools, by\noutsourcing transaction selection using a different PoW. By doing so\nthey could buy proof-of-uncensored-selection and proof-of-goodwill for a\nsmall fee.\nWe would allow full nodes to generate and broadcast a template\nblock which:\n* Does not contain a valid header yet\n* Contains the transaction selection\n* Contains a coinbase output with a predetermined part of the block\n reward (say 0.5%) to themselves* Contains a nonce for PoW of a predetermined currently ASIC resistant\n hash function behind a OP_RETURN.\nThe template with the highest PoW since the last block would be leading.\nA miner/pool can then choose to use this instead of their own, adding\nthe rest of the reward and the SHA nonce themselves. That way they would\nset up a competition among full nodes.\nThis would of course be voluntary but provable, so maybe in a pool's\ninterest to do this via naming and shaming.\nTomas\nbitcrust\n\nOn Wed, May 3, 2017, at 23:43, Ben Thompson via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e I feel like this would be pointless as the vast majority of users\n\u003e would likely download the blockchain from a node that was not\n\u003e enforcing a tip requirement as it would seem like unnecessary cost as\n\u003e in protocols such as BitTorrent there is no such tips in sharing files\n\u003e and the blockchain distribution is in eccense the same thing. However\n\u003e perhaps I am underestimating the generosity of node operators but I\n\u003e feel that adding a cost to the blockchain (assuming that all users add\n\u003e a tip requirement) would lead to centralisation.\u003e \n\u003e On Wed, 3 May 2017, 22:21 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, \u003cbitcoin-\n\u003e dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\u003e\u003e IDEA:\n\u003e\u003e - Full nodes advertise a bitcoin address. Users that need to\n\u003e\u003e download the block chain from that node can be encouraged to send a\n\u003e\u003e tip to the peers that served them (by % served). Recommended tip\n\u003e\u003e of 10mbit should be fine.\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e - A full nodes can *require* a tip to download the blockchain. If\n\u003e\u003e they do, users that don't specify a tip cannot use them.\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e CONS:\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e For some people, this may represent a barrier to hosting their own\n\u003e\u003e full node. After all, if you have to pay $15 just to get a copy of\n\u003e\u003e the blockchain, that just adds to the already expensive prospect of\n\u003e\u003e hosting a full node.\u003e\u003e PROS: \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e As long as you manage to stay online, you should get your money back\n\u003e\u003e and more. This is the an incentive for quality, long term hosting.\u003e\u003e In the long term, this should cause stable nodes to stick around\n\u003e\u003e longer. It also discourages \"installation spam\" attacks on the\n\u003e\u003e network.\u003e\u003e Fees for other node operations can be considered if this is\n\u003e\u003e successful.\u003e\u003e \n\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170504/c4a0d32c/attachment.html\u003e",
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