📅 Original date posted:2015-06-14
📝 Original message:Economic policy sounds like a dirty word in the context of Bitcoin, but as
Jeff Garzik said, choosing a block size cap is unfortunately an economic
policy that has to be chosen somehow. Enabling users to incentivise the
voting process is an interesting tool to have in the toolbox, but I think
it would be sensible to first observe how the miner-only voting system
behaves on its own.
If, for example, the hashing majority tended to favour a move towards
centralization (big blocks), user preferences could potentially hasten this
move by further punishing marginal miners through reduced fees. On the
other hand, if user preferences tended to oppose the preferences of miners,
then such a system might function well in keeping a balance between
usability and security (although it's not clear how this balance might
change over time as the block subsidy drops).
In short, I think it's wise to keep it simple and implement one mechanism
at a time.
On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 4:11 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed
> entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by
> hashing power.
>
> This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over
> the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions
> themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included
> in a block casting a specific vote.
>
> We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits
> either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some
> fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a
> nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or
> decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an
> indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via
> fees to vote according to user wishes.
>
> Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define an
> additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we
> can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a
> mechanism such as replace-by-fee.
>
>
> See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:
>
>
> https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg02323.html
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
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Ashley Holman [ARCHIVE] /
npub14g…u4vq6
2023-06-07 17:37:37
in reply to nevent1q…rd7v
Author Public Key
npub14gv4tc4w0zkzyrfa5u2gvsajqlf3cgevux3xth46ukfrnqlcl8xqru4vq6Published at
2023-06-07 17:37:37Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-06-14\n📝 Original message:Economic policy sounds like a dirty word in the context of Bitcoin, but as\nJeff Garzik said, choosing a block size cap is unfortunately an economic\npolicy that has to be chosen somehow. Enabling users to incentivise the\nvoting process is an interesting tool to have in the toolbox, but I think\nit would be sensible to first observe how the miner-only voting system\nbehaves on its own.\n\nIf, for example, the hashing majority tended to favour a move towards\ncentralization (big blocks), user preferences could potentially hasten this\nmove by further punishing marginal miners through reduced fees. On the\nother hand, if user preferences tended to oppose the preferences of miners,\nthen such a system might function well in keeping a balance between\nusability and security (although it's not clear how this balance might\nchange over time as the block subsidy drops).\n\nIn short, I think it's wise to keep it simple and implement one mechanism\nat a time.\n\nOn Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 4:11 AM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed\n\u003e entirely, with a \"soft\" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by\n\u003e hashing power.\n\u003e\n\u003e This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over\n\u003e the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions\n\u003e themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included\n\u003e in a block casting a specific vote.\n\u003e\n\u003e We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits\n\u003e either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some\n\u003e fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a\n\u003e nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or\n\u003e decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an\n\u003e indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via\n\u003e fees to vote according to user wishes.\n\u003e\n\u003e Of course, to cast a \"don't care\" vote we can either define an\n\u003e additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we\n\u003e can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a\n\u003e mechanism such as replace-by-fee.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg02323.html\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n\u003e 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150614/253e3f4d/attachment.html\u003e",
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