📅 Original date posted:2015-12-20
📝 Original message:Chris Priest 於 2015-12-19 22:47 寫到:
> On 12/19/15, jl2012 <jl2012 at xbt.hk> wrote:
>> Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-12-19 22:34 寫到:
>>> Block witholding attacks are only possible if you have a majority of
>>> hashpower. If you only have 20% hashpower, you can't do this attack.
>>> Currently, this attack is only a theoretical attack, as the ones with
>>> all the hashpower today are not engaging in this behavior. Even if
>>> someone who had a lot of hashpower decided to pull off this attack,
>>> they wouldn't be able to disrupt much. Once that time comes, then I
>>> think this problem should be solved, until then it should be a low
>>> priority. There are more important things to work on in the meantime.
>>>
>>
>> This is not true. For a pool with 5% total hash rate, an attacker only
>> needs 0.5% of hash rate to sabotage 10% of their income. It's already
>> enough to kill the pool
>>
>>
>
> This begs the question: If this is such a devastating attack, then why
> hasn't this attack brought down every pool in existence? As far as I'm
> aware, there are many pools in operation despite this possibility.
It did happen:
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/28242v/eligius_falls_victim_to_blocksolution_withholding/
The worst thing is that the proof for such attack is probabilistic, not
deterministic.
A smarter attacker may even pretend to be many small miners, make it
even more difficult or impossible to prove who are attacking.
> Then shouldn't this be something the pool deals with, not the bitcoin
> protocol?
The only solution is to ask for KYC registration, unless one could
propose
a cryptographic solution that does not require a consensus fork.
jl2012 [ARCHIVE] /
npub14v…jyksm
2023-06-07 19:47:00
in reply to nevent1q…klxy
Author Public Key
npub14vwgt02663pkxx54kg5t693shaavmvnldhsp49sve7asw7p36lkqljyksmPublished at
2023-06-07 19:47:00Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-12-20\n📝 Original message:Chris Priest 於 2015-12-19 22:47 寫到:\n\u003e On 12/19/15, jl2012 \u003cjl2012 at xbt.hk\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-12-19 22:34 寫到:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Block witholding attacks are only possible if you have a majority of\n\u003e\u003e\u003e hashpower. If you only have 20% hashpower, you can't do this attack.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Currently, this attack is only a theoretical attack, as the ones with\n\u003e\u003e\u003e all the hashpower today are not engaging in this behavior. Even if\n\u003e\u003e\u003e someone who had a lot of hashpower decided to pull off this attack,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e they wouldn't be able to disrupt much. Once that time comes, then I\n\u003e\u003e\u003e think this problem should be solved, until then it should be a low\n\u003e\u003e\u003e priority. There are more important things to work on in the meantime.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e This is not true. For a pool with 5% total hash rate, an attacker only\n\u003e\u003e needs 0.5% of hash rate to sabotage 10% of their income. It's already\n\u003e\u003e enough to kill the pool\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e This begs the question: If this is such a devastating attack, then why\n\u003e hasn't this attack brought down every pool in existence? As far as I'm\n\u003e aware, there are many pools in operation despite this possibility.\n\nIt did happen: \nhttps://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/28242v/eligius_falls_victim_to_blocksolution_withholding/\n\nThe worst thing is that the proof for such attack is probabilistic, not\ndeterministic.\n\nA smarter attacker may even pretend to be many small miners, make it\neven more difficult or impossible to prove who are attacking.\n\n\n\u003e Then shouldn't this be something the pool deals with, not the bitcoin \n\u003e protocol?\n\nThe only solution is to ask for KYC registration, unless one could \npropose\na cryptographic solution that does not require a consensus fork.",
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