I agree that cost of attack for a state actor would be marginal but I don’t think those attacks could achieve much in the long run because there would be a reaction from the network either through upgrades and/or brining more hash power online. This would ultimately strengthen the network in the long run even if it can undermine the trust in it at first. Also, specifically on #Monero it would be challenging to selectively censor transactions. Double-spending would undermine trust in the network but wouldn’t achieve much. I guess empty blocks could be mined but for how long?
My point is that, I don’t think this type of attack is practical for a state actor to conduct. That’s also not how they proceed to attack blockchains. If a state actor were to be caught conducting this attack (through whistleblowers or other leaks), it would strongly undermine their credibility which is a key factor for states to maintain.
As we see, state actors prefer attacking those systems through regulations, weaponization of their agencies and propaganda.
Again, I’m not saying that such attacks are out of reach of state actors but until proven otherwise, it doesn’t appear that those are the most effective to conduct.
I’m curious what other are your thoughts on other Sybil resistance mechanisms such as PoS. Would you say that those tend to be more resistant to state actors? Which mechanism would you favor? There are more and more blockchains adopting hybrid PoW/PoS models.
LogicallyMinded
npub1s0f…rqf5
2024-05-14 18:59:36
in reply to nevent1q…vt42
Author Public Key
npub1s0fs9dwztm2rukm42vh6df4a5gwykclf75tgyeuc75t0cs2eh8rsu2rqf5Published at
2024-05-14 18:59:36Event JSON
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"content": "I agree that cost of attack for a state actor would be marginal but I don’t think those attacks could achieve much in the long run because there would be a reaction from the network either through upgrades and/or brining more hash power online. This would ultimately strengthen the network in the long run even if it can undermine the trust in it at first. Also, specifically on #Monero it would be challenging to selectively censor transactions. Double-spending would undermine trust in the network but wouldn’t achieve much. I guess empty blocks could be mined but for how long? \n\nMy point is that, I don’t think this type of attack is practical for a state actor to conduct. That’s also not how they proceed to attack blockchains. If a state actor were to be caught conducting this attack (through whistleblowers or other leaks), it would strongly undermine their credibility which is a key factor for states to maintain. \n\nAs we see, state actors prefer attacking those systems through regulations, weaponization of their agencies and propaganda. \n\nAgain, I’m not saying that such attacks are out of reach of state actors but until proven otherwise, it doesn’t appear that those are the most effective to conduct. \n\nI’m curious what other are your thoughts on other Sybil resistance mechanisms such as PoS. Would you say that those tend to be more resistant to state actors? Which mechanism would you favor? There are more and more blockchains adopting hybrid PoW/PoS models.",
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