Thank you Super Testnet. I have been thinking about this, and I’m running into issues with a multisig setup. Perhaps this is something bitVM is also unable to solve.
If Alice adds funds for collateral and Bob refuses to respond, then Alice loses her collateral and it cost Bob nothing.
We could make it where Alice can get her money back if Bob doesn’t respond. However, if Bob does respond and Alice pays, Bob could use his own private key to take back his part. Now Bob has his 10 BTC + the payment, but Alice is short the payment and only gets her collateral back.
So the incentives are better if it’s all or nothing for both, but Bob can be evil for free. Would bitVM run into the same dilemma?
BTCapsule 🏴🧡 /
npub1v6x…xk5t
2024-05-10 06:43:04
in reply to nevent1q…fzay
Author Public Key
npub1v6xwae25wh6etmqw3m6yce9lnk5dnhtqpzk9fhxjfvjsryctjc8q2kxk5tPublished at
2024-05-10 06:43:04Event JSON
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"content": "Thank you Super Testnet. I have been thinking about this, and I’m running into issues with a multisig setup. Perhaps this is something bitVM is also unable to solve.\n\nIf Alice adds funds for collateral and Bob refuses to respond, then Alice loses her collateral and it cost Bob nothing. \n\nWe could make it where Alice can get her money back if Bob doesn’t respond. However, if Bob does respond and Alice pays, Bob could use his own private key to take back his part. Now Bob has his 10 BTC + the payment, but Alice is short the payment and only gets her collateral back.\n\nSo the incentives are better if it’s all or nothing for both, but Bob can be evil for free. Would bitVM run into the same dilemma?",
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