Aaradhya Chauhan [ARCHIVE] / is on Nostr

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🗓️ Active from 2022-07-26 to 2022-08-03
💬 Posted a total of 5 messages
📚 Participated in the following categories: bitcoin-dev
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2023-06-08 01:12:22

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-08-03
📝 Original message:Thank you for answering. I'll check out the link you provided, while also
playing around with the fee settings for my own full node, at my home
server.
On Wed, 3 Aug 2022 at 23:02, vjudeu via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> It is possible, because you can find nodes that accept low-fee
> transactions. And on some statistics, for example
> https://jochen-hoenicke.de/queue/#BTC,24h,weight,0 you can see that zero
> to one satoshi per virtual byte transactions could take more space than
> other transactions. You can be convinced that those charts are not fake by
> running a full node and reaching some nodes with different fee settings. If
> miners don't want to accept them, well, it is their choice to leave that
> money on the table. As long as the basic block reward is sufficient, they
> don't have to accept such low fee transactions, because they can wait
> instead, to receive them in some batched form.
>
> Also, some miners could accept only 10 sats/vB or higher, because why not.
> As long as your transaction will reach enough nodes to be confirmed, you
> can safely pick lower fees. For now, de-facto standard is one satoshi per
> virtual byte, but:
>
> 1) it is only declared, so you can rely only on declarations, not on hard
> consensus rules
> 2) there is no way to make sure if some transaction was truly rejected by
> some miner, or maybe it was saved somewhere
> 3) you can never be sure if some node is a miner and can enforce those
> different fee rules or not
>
> So, you can really judge only by how nodes behave, you cannot make sure in
> any way if anyone is running some additional rules. And fees are not a part
> of the consensus, so they can be freely adjusted by each node, and there is
> no way to make sure, what rules are really executed, you can only assume
> that, based on what transactions are included in blocks.
>
>
>
> On 2022-08-03 18:19:12 user Aaradhya Chauhan via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> So, can we conclude by something, whether or not it would be possible and
> feasible in the future?
>
>
> On Mon, 1 Aug 2022 at 19:08, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 01, 2022 at 01:19:05PM +0000, aliashraf.btc At protonmail
> wrote:
> > > On Sat, Jul 30, 2022 at 05:24:35PM +0000, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > > like a hashcash-based alternative broadcast scheme.
> > Hi Peter,
> > I've been mulling the idea of attaching work to low fee txns, both as a
> compensation (e.g., in a sidechain, or an alt), and/or as a spam proof.
> Unfortunately, both suffer from ASICs:
> > For spam proof case, the adversary can easily buy a used/obsolete device
> to produce lots of spam txns very cheaply, unless you put the bar very
> high, making it almost impossible for average users to even try.
> > The compensation scenario is pretty off-topic, still, interesting enough
> for 1 min read:
> > Wallets commit to the latest blockchain state in the transaction AND
> attach work.
> > It is considered contribution to the security (illegitimate chains can't
> include the txn), hence isrewarded by fee discount/exemption depending on
> the offset of the state they've committed to (the closer, the better) and
> the amount of work attached.
> > For this to work, block difficulty is calculated inclusive with the work
> embedded in the txns, it contains. Sophisticated and consequential, yet not
> infeasible per se.
> >
> > Unfortunately, this scheme is hard to balance with ASICs in the scene
> too, for instance, you can't subsidize wallets for their work like with a
> leverge, because miners can easily do it locally, seizing the subsidies for
> themselves, long story, not relevant just ignore it.
>
> We're not talking about a consensus system here. Just a way to rate-limit
> access to a broadcast network used by a small minority of nodes. It's
> completely ok to simply change the PoW algorithm in the _highly_ unlikely
> event
> someone bothers to build an ASIC for it. Since this isn't a consensu
> system,
> it's totally ok if multiple versions of the scheme run in parallel.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-08 01:12:22

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-08-03
📝 Original message:So, can we conclude by something, whether or not it would be possible and
feasible in the future?
On Mon, 1 Aug 2022 at 19:08, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 01, 2022 at 01:19:05PM +0000, aliashraf.btc At protonmail
> wrote:
> > > On Sat, Jul 30, 2022 at 05:24:35PM +0000, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > > like a hashcash-based alternative broadcast scheme.
> > Hi Peter,
> > I've been mulling the idea of attaching work to low fee txns, both as a
> compensation (e.g., in a sidechain, or an alt), and/or as a spam proof.
> Unfortunately, both suffer from ASICs:
> > For spam proof case, the adversary can easily buy a used/obsolete device
> to produce lots of spam txns very cheaply, unless you put the bar very
> high, making it almost impossible for average users to even try.
> > The compensation scenario is pretty off-topic, still, interesting enough
> for 1 min read:
> > Wallets commit to the latest blockchain state in the transaction AND
> attach work.
> > It is considered contribution to the security (illegitimate chains can't
> include the txn), hence isrewarded by fee discount/exemption depending on
> the offset of the state they've committed to (the closer, the better) and
> the amount of work attached.
> > For this to work, block difficulty is calculated inclusive with the work
> embedded in the txns, it contains. Sophisticated and consequential, yet not
> infeasible per se.
> >
> > Unfortunately, this scheme is hard to balance with ASICs in the scene
> too, for instance, you can't subsidize wallets for their work like with a
> leverge, because miners can easily do it locally, seizing the subsidies for
> themselves, long story, not relevant just ignore it.
>
> We're not talking about a consensus system here. Just a way to rate-limit
> access to a broadcast network used by a small minority of nodes. It's
> completely ok to simply change the PoW algorithm in the _highly_ unlikely
> event
> someone bothers to build an ASIC for it. Since this isn't a consensu
> system,
> it's totally ok if multiple versions of the scheme run in parallel.
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-08 01:12:12

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-07-29
📝 Original message:I think you misunderstood what I said. I did not say that it should be done
now, for the obvious reasons that the miners won't be doing any good by
such measures. But I am talking about when the price of BTC escalates to a
point when 1sat/vB becomes expensive as a dust limit. If the price
oscillates at that point and above, it would actually create the same
incentives as it is today. All I imply is to maintain the affordability of
the minimum possible fee if one is ready to wait.
On Fri, 29 Jul 2022 at 9:08 AM David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On 2022-07-26 02:45, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 26, 2022 at 01:56:05PM +0530, Aaradhya Chauhan via
> > bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >> [...] in its early days, 1 sat/vB was a good dust protection
> >> measure. But now, I think it's a bit high [...] I think it can be done
> >> easily [...]
> >
> > [...] lowering the dust limit now is a good way to ensure
> > the entire ecosystem is ready to deal with those conditions.
>
> I don't have anything new to add to the conversation at this time, but I
> did want to suggest a clarification and summarize some previous
> discussion that might be useful.
>
> I think the phrasing by Aaradhya Chauhan and Peter Todd above are
> conflating the minimum output amount policy ("dust limit") with the
> minimum transaction relay feerate policy ("min tx relay fee"). Any
> transaction with an output amount below a node's configured dust limit
> (a few hundred sat by default) will not be relayed by that node no
> matter how high of a feerate it pays. Any transaction with feerate
> below a nodes's minimum relay feerate (1 sat/vbyte by default) will not
> be relayed by that node even if the node has unused space in its mempool
> and peers that use BIP133 feefilters to advertise that they would accept
> low feerates.
>
> Removing the dust limit was discussed extensively a year ago[1] with
> additional follow-up discussion about eight months ago.[2]
>
> Lowering the minimum relay feerate was seriously proposed in a patch to
> Bitcoin Core four years ago[3] with additional related PRs being opened
> to ease the change. Not all of the related PRs have been merged yet,
> and the original PR was closed. I can't easily find some of the
> discussions I remember related to that change, but IIRC part of the
> challenge was that lower minimum relay fees reduce the cost of a variety
> of DoS attacks which could impact BIP152 compact blocks and erlay
> efficiency, could worsen transaction pinning, may increase IBD time due
> to more block chain data, and have other adverse effects. Additionally,
> we've found in the past that some people who build systems that take
> advantage of low feerates become upset when feerates rise, sometimes
> creating problems even for people who prepared for eventual feerate
> rises.
>
> Compared to the complexity of lowering the minimum feerate, the
> challenges of preventing denial/degregation-of-service attacks, and
> dealing with a fragmented userbase, the economic benefit of reducing the
> feerates for the bottom of the mempool seems small---if we lower min
> feerates to 1/10th their current values and that results in the
> equivalent of an extra 10 blocks of transactions getting mined a day,
> then users save a total of 0.09 BTC (~$1,800 USD) per day and miners
> earn an extra 0.01 BTC ($200 USD) per day (assuming all other things
> remain equal).[4]
>
> -Dave
>
> [1]
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-August/019307.html
> [2]
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-December/019635.html
> [3] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13922
> [4] The current min relay fee is 1 sat/vbyte. There are ~1 million
> vbytes in a block that can be allocated to regular transactions. Ten
> blocks at the current min relay fee would pay (10 * 1e6 / 1e8 = 0.1 BTC)
> in fees. Ten blocks at 1/10 sat/vbyte would thus pay 0.01 BTC in fees,
> which is $200 USD @ $20k/BTC. Thus users would save (0.1 - 0.01 = 0.09
> BTC = $1,800 USD @ $20k/BTC).
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-08 01:12:12

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-07-30
📝 Original message:I'm not suggesting to initiate it anytime soon. But suppose, let's take a
situation where Bitcoin reaches and oscillates above 200k to 500k USD, then
1 sat/vB could be equivalent to 10 sat/vB of today, hampering the "dust
requirement" (ignoring inflation). I discussed this on the Bitcoin
subreddit and some suggested that the developers, in the future, have to
just change the "default minimum relay tx fee" from 1000 today to 500 at
that time. Obviously it's gonna be a little above 500, if we count
inflation. That would simply equate to the current situation. Do you think
that would be a problem?
On Fri, 29 Jul 2022 at 09:08, David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On 2022-07-26 02:45, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 26, 2022 at 01:56:05PM +0530, Aaradhya Chauhan via
> > bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >> [...] in its early days, 1 sat/vB was a good dust protection
> >> measure. But now, I think it's a bit high [...] I think it can be done
> >> easily [...]
> >
> > [...] lowering the dust limit now is a good way to ensure
> > the entire ecosystem is ready to deal with those conditions.
>
> I don't have anything new to add to the conversation at this time, but I
> did want to suggest a clarification and summarize some previous
> discussion that might be useful.
>
> I think the phrasing by Aaradhya Chauhan and Peter Todd above are
> conflating the minimum output amount policy ("dust limit") with the
> minimum transaction relay feerate policy ("min tx relay fee"). Any
> transaction with an output amount below a node's configured dust limit
> (a few hundred sat by default) will not be relayed by that node no
> matter how high of a feerate it pays. Any transaction with feerate
> below a nodes's minimum relay feerate (1 sat/vbyte by default) will not
> be relayed by that node even if the node has unused space in its mempool
> and peers that use BIP133 feefilters to advertise that they would accept
> low feerates.
>
> Removing the dust limit was discussed extensively a year ago[1] with
> additional follow-up discussion about eight months ago.[2]
>
> Lowering the minimum relay feerate was seriously proposed in a patch to
> Bitcoin Core four years ago[3] with additional related PRs being opened
> to ease the change. Not all of the related PRs have been merged yet,
> and the original PR was closed. I can't easily find some of the
> discussions I remember related to that change, but IIRC part of the
> challenge was that lower minimum relay fees reduce the cost of a variety
> of DoS attacks which could impact BIP152 compact blocks and erlay
> efficiency, could worsen transaction pinning, may increase IBD time due
> to more block chain data, and have other adverse effects. Additionally,
> we've found in the past that some people who build systems that take
> advantage of low feerates become upset when feerates rise, sometimes
> creating problems even for people who prepared for eventual feerate
> rises.
>
> Compared to the complexity of lowering the minimum feerate, the
> challenges of preventing denial/degregation-of-service attacks, and
> dealing with a fragmented userbase, the economic benefit of reducing the
> feerates for the bottom of the mempool seems small---if we lower min
> feerates to 1/10th their current values and that results in the
> equivalent of an extra 10 blocks of transactions getting mined a day,
> then users save a total of 0.09 BTC (~$1,800 USD) per day and miners
> earn an extra 0.01 BTC ($200 USD) per day (assuming all other things
> remain equal).[4]
>
> -Dave
>
> [1]
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-August/019307.html
> [2]
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-December/019635.html
> [3] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13922
> [4] The current min relay fee is 1 sat/vbyte. There are ~1 million
> vbytes in a block that can be allocated to regular transactions. Ten
> blocks at the current min relay fee would pay (10 * 1e6 / 1e8 = 0.1 BTC)
> in fees. Ten blocks at 1/10 sat/vbyte would thus pay 0.01 BTC in fees,
> which is $200 USD @ $20k/BTC. Thus users would save (0.1 - 0.01 = 0.09
> BTC = $1,800 USD @ $20k/BTC).
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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2023-06-08 01:12:09

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2022-07-26
📝 Original message:I know this might be a sort of repetition for a previous question, but I do
want to know from enthusiasts in this group that while Bitcoin was trading
at much lower price in its early days, 1 sat/vB was a good dust protection
measure. But now, I think it's a bit high for merely a dust protection
measure, and should be lowered slightly. Even if not, it should be lowered
to half when prices go double than today and keeps oscillating at that
point. As it's not a consensus rule, I think it can be done easily, just
needing support from full node operators. I support LN but I think
transaction affordability should remain constant in the future. If I'm okay
to wait in a queue, I should have the option for same affordability for
minimum fees in the future as it is today. (Like we still have posts today
while email still exists).
Awaiting your response.
Regards
Aaradhya Chauhan
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