Ella Jakubowska

Digital human rights policy nerd at civil society group EDRi (npub1w4r…8cxz), posting mostly about EU laws relating to #biometrics or #CSAR (aka #ChatControl).

🇪🇺 🏳️‍🌈 (she/her)
🍉 #FreePalestine

Twitter: https://twitter.com/ellajakubowska1

Last Notes

2026-03-08 08:13:19 GMT

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I've seen a lot of bad laws in my time at EDRi but this one gets first prize for its complete lack of humanity. It is essential that MEPs reject this law when they vote tomorrow.
If you're reading this over your Sunday morning coffee, there is still *just* time to do something:
✍️ Sign the petition NOW: https://action.wemove.eu/sign/2025-12-no-deportation-petition-EN/
(2/

2026-03-08 08:12:13 GMT

⚠️ Tomorrow, the 9th of March, MEPs in the civil liberties committee of the European Parliament are voting on a truly chilling proposal for a new EU mass Deportation Law, aka the "Returns Regulation".
As organisations like Equinox: Racial Justice Initiative, Access Now and others in the ProtectNotSurveil coalition have highlighted, this is a big step towards creating an EU version of ICE, codifying racial profiling and further criminalising solidarity and movement in Europe.
(1/

2025-11-16 18:11:21 GMT

RE: https://eupolicy.social/@ella/115463747493432363
Positive update on #ChatControl. The EU's member states are set to officially agree to delete forced mass scanning orders (which could undermine encryption) this week!
This puts the protection of civil liberties in a much better situation for final negotiations with the EU Parliament.
However, it doesn't mean that all the proposal's issues have been solved - we're especially worried about the threat of forcing message apps, email services and app stores to perform risky age verification.
#note1cxr…5g65

2025-10-30 15:09:27 GMT

(1/2) Is this the end of #ChatControl ?
Well, not quite, but big news nevertheless!
The Danish govt has told reporters that they plan to drop the Commission's proposed "Detection Orders" (mandates requiring chat and email providers to scan people's private communications, even if it breaks end-to-end encryption), due to a lack of political support.
Having previously been fierce proponents of encryption-breaking mass scanning, this is a big change from Denmark.
However, it DOESN'T mean....

2025-10-08 16:53:32 GMT

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In the last few days, there has been a huge mobilisation again #ChatControl, with many individuals and NGOs in the #EU telling their governments they want to protect encryption and reject mass surveillance.
It seems that our voices are being heard: the vote of ministers on 14th October has been cancelled! This is democracy in action.
Let's hope EU lawmakers take this opportunity to go back to the drawing board and figure out a plan to tackle CSAM in a way that is legally and technically safe.

2025-10-06 14:46:12 GMT

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- So what can we do? Well, national ministers and MPs really need to hear (ideally before Wednesday 8th) that people across the EU do not support measures that would undermine encryption or amount to mass surveillance - meaning that the Danish proposal must be opposed (https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/New-DK-Pres-text-3-October-2025.pdf);
- German, French and Italian lawmakers can be contacted easily, thanks to fightchatcontrol.eu;
- I'll share more as it happens! #StopChatControl
(7/x)

2025-10-06 14:40:29 GMT

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- In the vote this week (8 October), ambassadors from all EU Member States will get together (behind closed doors) to indicate how they plan to vote at the main (public) vote (14 October);
- A lot of people will be looking at Germany, who have long been opposed to #ChatControl, but who are now rumoured to be considering the Danish proposal. Germany is very important because if they switched to support the proposal, Denmark might be able to secure a deal (https://edri.org/our-work/chat-control-what-is-actually-going-on/);
(6/x)

2025-10-06 14:28:22 GMT

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- So what now? Well, Denmark has put forward a "new" text dated 3 Oct (which actually just recycles all the old ideas that were already rejected). Whilst Denmark says that it contains "more safeguards", the text continues to have "Detection Orders" that would scan end-to-end encrypted communications, and they even expressly say that they'd use "Client-Side Scanning" for this;
- As per the official process, Denmark is putting this text to vote twice - once this week, and once next week;
(5/x)

2025-10-06 13:59:00 GMT

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- More than ever, the Council is being put under immense pressure to find agreement. Six countries have tried and failed to get a deal so far - and the only one that actually opposed #ChatControl was Poland.
- Denmark is now the country that is trying to get a Council deal, and their Justice minister has been coming out with all sorts of wild stuff like "I believe that more surveillance equates to more freedom" (see the @npub14rv…y6tq campaign for more);
(4/x)

2025-10-06 13:54:32 GMT

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- We collected info about the main Commission controversies, including *confirmed illegal actions*, here: https://edri.org/our-work/csa-regulation-document-pool/;
- Since then, a lot has happened. The European Parliament adopted a pretty good position against #ChatControl back in 2023;
- But "the Council" (the grouping of EU Member States) doesn't have a position yet. They've gone back and forth for literally years and luckily, a sufficient number of countries have always said no to mass surveillance + breaking E2EE;
(3/x)

2025-10-06 13:50:45 GMT

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- Yes, the Commission's proposal contained some "safeguards", but all the official legal services of the EU institutions warned that these would not be enough to make the proposal lawful. In fact, they were all clear that if adopted, the proposal would amount to mass surveillance and would undermine encryption (https://edri.org/our-work/most-criticised-eu-law-of-all-time/);
- Despite this, the Commission's Home Affairs dept has lobbied for their own law in an unprecedented way - which several times led to maladministration;
(2/x)

2025-10-06 13:47:18 GMT

A lot of people talking about the EU's #ChatControl bill, and rightly so. There are 2 really important votes coming up.
As someone who has worked on it for 4 years (before the official proposal was even put forward) from a digital human rights perspective, here's a quick recap / informed source of what the heck is actually going on:
- The European Commission put forward a proposal in 2022 to mass scan public and private communications, using AI, in case of people sharing abuse material;
(1/x)

2024-12-12 12:22:43 GMT

For those who followed my posts yesterday, you'll be glad to know that Hungary's strategy to shame the 'blocking minority' at today's Council meeting did not go well for them.
Following the Hungary's warning that "remember, we are live", 10 countries took the floor to explain why they cannot support the proposal.
This is one of the strongest set of statements we have seen in defence of end-to-end encryption and against mass surveillance of private communications!

2024-12-11 13:10:58 GMT

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- I'd suggest that we need to continue to show governments like Hungary, Sweden, Ireland and Spain that they are ignoring the consensus of cybersecurity and human rights experts (e.g. https://edri.org/our-work/most-criticised-eu-law-of-all-time/) and that Hungary's latest text still undermines end-to-end encryption;
- We also need to give our support to the countries that have listened to science and evidence, and are waiting for a proposal that is lawful and would actually work before giving their support;

2024-12-11 13:08:47 GMT

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- Perhaps even worse still, there are indications that many of the pro-Chat Control countries are endorsing this dangerous and undemocratic strategy of Hungary;
- I have never seen a strategy like this: where a Presidency knows a public Ministerial vote will fail, but they do it anyway to sow discord;
- So what can you / we all do?

2024-12-11 13:07:24 GMT

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- Now, we are hearing from several directions that Hungary sees tomorrow's live-streamed vote of the EU's Justice & Home Affairs Ministers as a chance to publicly shame the blocking minority countries, falsely suggesting that they don't care about children;
- Rather than trying to actually broker a meaningful and sustainable deal to protect children online while also upholding privacy, the Hungarian presidency seems to have preferred to engage in strong-arm tactics;

2024-12-11 13:03:56 GMT

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(continued)
- On the other hand, governments including Poland, Germany, Austria, Czechia, Slovenia, Estonia, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have long said they can only agree to a deal that protects encryption and rules out mass surveillance. Finland also recently joined this 'blocking minority';
- The latest text - which has been put forward by the current stewards of the EU Council - Hungary - does NOT achieve that (even though Hungary have falsely claimed that it does);

2024-12-11 12:58:33 GMT

⚠️ 🇪🇺 Tomorrow, something unprecedented (and IMO completely unhinged) will be happening on the EU's draft CSA Regulation (#ChatControl).
Here's my take on what's happening & what you can do to help as someone that cares about digital rights:
- The law has been stalled for years because the EU Council (reps of all the member states) cannot agree to a position;
- On the one hand, you have governments like Spain who have admitted that they want to put a stop to encryption;
🧵